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FEDERAL TAXATION: BARTER-EQUATION TECHNIQUE
EMPLOYED TO VALUE TRANSFERRED SECURITIES
DESPITE PRESENCE OF ACTIVE MARKET
IN Seas Shipping Co. v. Commissioner' the Second Circuit cautiously
affirmed the Tax Court's utilization2 of the barter-equation method3
to determine the value of stock received as partial consideration in a
sales transaction, despite the presence of an active market in the
transferred stock. In March 1957, the taxpayer, Seas Shipping Co.,
sold ten ships to Moore-McCormack Lines for cash, notes, and
300,000 shares of Moore-McCormack stock. In the year of the
exchange, 166,000 shares of Moore-McCormack stock were traded on
the New York Stock Exchange at an average annual price of slightly
less than twenty-three dollars. However, when Moore-McCormack
subsequently sold two of the ships that year, it computed the value
of the stock at thirty dollars per share for capital gains purposes.4 In
contrast, Seas Shipping, in computing the amount realized from
the sale of the ten ships, estimated a fair market value of approxi-
mately twenty dollars per share, based upon the trading price ad-
justed for blockage. To remedy this disparity, the Commissioner
assessed deficiencies against both taxpayers and computed the stock's
value to be thirty dollars per share for the purpose of measuring Seas
Shipping's gain.5 This determination was made by subtracting from
the total of the individual ship values enumerated in the sales con-
tract the amount of cash and notes received and equating the result-
nine million dollars-with the total value of the 300,000 shares.
The Second Circuit upheld this rejection of the trading price and
the substitution of the barter-equation method on the basis of the
Tax Court's apparent factual finding that an annual market of
166,000 shares was too sparse a basis upon which to value a block
of 300,000 shares.
1 371 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1967).
2 See Seas Shipping Co., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mew. 1337 (1965).
2 See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1965) (values of properties exchanged
in arm's length transaction presumed equal); 371 F.2d at 529 n.2 (collecting cases).
l 'Id. at 529.
5See Seas Shipping Co., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1337 (1965). See also Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc., 44 T.C. 745 (1965) (sustaining the thirty dollars per share
computation).
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Valuation of stock is necessitated when a capital asset is ex-
changed for stock, because the purchaser of the property must value
the stock to establish a basis for future capital gains6 and the present
depreciation of the asset,7 while the seller must make a similar
determination to compute his gain or loss from the sale.8 This valua-
tion process occurs in one of three situations. If the stock has an
established market for which quotations are available at the critical
time, the prices actually paid for the stock on an established exchange
on or around the valuation date are generally regarded as the
best evidence of the stock's fair market value as of that date.9 How-
ever, if the stock has no established market or if the market quota-
tions are either unavailable or so scarce that they do not reflect fair
market value,10 then other evidence of value, such as dividend
record, book value, capitalization of earnings, type of management,
and general economic conditions are factors considered in the com-
putation of value."' Between these two categorical positions lie the
less predictable cases wherein independent factors may render the
quotation price unreliable, and consequently, the exchange quotation
is not accepted as determinative of the stock's fair market value.
This third situation may occur when there is a lack of confidence
in market prices, deriving from the manner in which an exchange
operates. Thus when the quotation price is the result of a controlled
market, the trading price will be rejected.' 2 A similar approach was
'See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001 (a), (b).
T See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167 (g); Fox River Paper Corp. v. United States, 65 F.
Supp. 605 (E.D. Wis. 1946), aff'd, 165 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1948).
8 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001 (a), (b).
'See, e.g., W. T. Grant Co. v. Duggan, 94 F.2d 859, 861 (2d Cir. 1938); Hazeltine
Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 513, 519-20 (3d Cir. 1937); Commissioner v. Robertson,
75 F.2d 540, 541-42 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 763 (1935); Estate of Caroline
McCulloch Spencer, 5 T.C. 904, 907-08 (1945). See generally LOWNDES & KRAMER,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAxES § 18.25 (2d ed. 1962). But see 10 MERTENS, FEDERAL
INCOME TAX § 59.14 (Zimet ed. 1964).
10 See e.g., Argonaut Consol. Mining Co. v. Anderson, 52 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1931),
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 682 (1932); Automatic Transp. Co., 3 B.T.A. 505, 508 (1926).
11 See Rev. Rul. 65-192, 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 259 (income tax); Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1
CuM. BULL. 237, superseding Rev. Rul. 54-77, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 187 (estate and gift
tax). See generally LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 9, § 18.27; 10 MERTENS, op.
cit. supra note 9, §§ 59.21-.28; Katz, The Valuation of a Closed Corporation For Estate
Tax Purposes, 29 KAN. Crry L. REv. 1, 7-38 (1961).
12 See Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314, 318-19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 748 (1943) (securities issued in payment of bond interest); Propper v. Commis-
sioner, 89 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1937); Tex-Penn Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 83 F.2d 518,
523 (3d Cir. 1936), afJ'd, 300 U.S. 481 (1937); Continental Oil Co. v. United States,
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taken during the highly inflationary period of 1929 when the market
quotations did not accurately reflect market value because of specula-
tion and the presence of unskilled investors.'3 Regardless of the
reason, once the trading price is discarded, a court may decide that
the stock is incapable of valuation and thus that no tax is due 4 or
that while the stock has value it must be determined by the con-
sideration of other economic factors.15 Since rejection of the trading
price is rare and the determination that the market is controlled is
apparently a factual one, a predictive standard cannot be articulated.
In any event, the exchange price is not always totally disregarded.
For example, if upon the simultaneous disposition of the number of
shares to be valued the taxpayer would receive a value lower than
the market price because of the sudden increase in supply, then the
trading price may be reduced 6 as a concession to this economic fact.
The recognition of this phenomenon, called blockage,17 is not auto-
matic' but rather depends upon the peculiar facts of each case'0
as well as upon the skill with which the taxpayer's counsel dem-
62 F. Supp. 876 (Ct. Cl. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 847 (1946); Wallis Tractor Co.,
3 B.T.A. 981, 1002-03 (1926).
Is See Strong v. Roberts, 14 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1207, 1220, 1224 (D.N.J. 1933), aff'd,
72 Fnd 455 (3d Cir.), -cert. denied, 293 U.S.' 621 (1934) (exchange quotation over one
hundred dollars, court's valuation sixty-five dollars). But see Susan T. Freshman, 33
B.T.A. 394, 402-03 (1935). See generally LOWNDFS & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 19,
§ 18.19.14 E.g., Propper v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1937); Harold H. Kuchman,
18 T.C. 154 (1952); cf. Society Brand Clothes Inc., 18 T.C. 304, 314-18 (1952).
15E.g., Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1931), cert.
denied, 285 U.S. 548 (1932); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 876, 886
(Ct. Cl. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 847 (1946); Wallis Tractor Co., 3 B.T.A. 981, 1003-
04 (1926).
26See Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55, 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 689
(1942); Commissioner v. Shattuck, 97 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1938); Helvering v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 95 F.2d 806, 812 (4th Cir. 1938); Bartol v. McGinnes, 185 F. Supp.
659, 661-62 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Havemeyer v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 537, 548-51 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 326 US. 759 (1945).
1T See generally Badger, Blockage as a Valuation Problem, N.Y.U. 20ns INst. ON
Fan. TAX 587 (1962); Hughes, "Blockage" in Valuation of Assets for Federal Tax
Purposes, 25 FOEDHAM L. Rav. 702 (1956); Riecker, Blockage in Federal Estate and
Gift Tax Valuation, Mich. S.B.J., Aug. 1963, p. 24.
IsSee, e.g., Warner v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1952) (per curiam);
Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
796 (1946); Mott v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1943); Robert L. Clause, 5
T.C. 647, aff'd mem., 154 F.2d 655 (1945); John J. Newberry, 39 B.T.A. 1123, 1128-34
(1939); Archibald M. Chisholm, 37 B.T.A. 167, 170-71 (1938). See generally LOWNDEs &
KRmm, op. cit. supra note 9, § 18.26; Hughes, supra note 17, at 707.
19 Compare Bartol v. McGinnes, 185 F. Supp. 659, 661 (E.D. Pa. 1960), with Mott
v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1943).
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onstrates that the market will be unable to absorb the number of
shares being valued without serious price readjustment. 20 Thus,
while blockage does yield a price different from the exchange price,
the variation results from a modification of the quotation price and
not from a rejection of this factor.
The Second Circuit allowed the Tax Court to disregard the
market price of the Moore-McCormack stock on the basis of the
finding that the market was too sparse for purposes of valuing
the large block of stock. It concluded that "there was present,
therefore, a necessity for the Tax Court to turn to the barter-equation
method,"21 a test which has been previously employed to determine
the value of inchoate marital rights22 and a passenger railroad
franchise extension.23 The court recognized debilities inherent in
the barter-equation technique,24 but it indicated that other indicia
of value supporting the result reached by this method. Specifically,
the court noted that the stock had a book value in excess of thirty-
nine dollars, that it constituted a thirteen per cent ownership of a
profitable corporation, and that as a result of a contemporaneous
voting trust the taxpayer received control of twenty per cent of the
directorships for a five-year period.25 Moreover, the court considered
it "highly unlikely" that twenty-three dollars was accepted by the
taxpayer as the stock's value since adoption of this figure would
have meant that it had sold the ships for two million dollars less
than they were worth.20  Acknowledging the lack of any precedent
for the use of the barter-equation method in the presence of an
active market, the court nonetheless affirmed the Tax Court's de-
cision by emphasizing that the sale was an arm's length transaction
between two knowledgeable shipowners who had stipulated in the
contract that the value of the stock was thirty dollars per share.2
With the exception of those cases involving a controlled market,28
20 See Badger, supra note 17, at 588-90; Hughes, supra note 17, at 709-10; Riecker,
supra note 17, at 26.
21 371 F.2d at 532.
22 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), 1963 Du=r L.J. 365.
28 Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl.
1954).
2, 371 F.2d at 529-30.
23 d. at 530.
26 
Id. at 532.2
7 Ibid.
28 See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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Seas Shipping appears to be the only income tax case which has
rejected the trading price in the presence of an active market on an
established exchange. While there is a trend toward the application
of blockage in income tax cases, 29 the approach in that situation is
disinguishable, for there the trading price is not rejected but merely
modified. Here, however, the trading price was completely dis-
regarded because the market was considered "too thin." Yet, neither
the Tax Court nor the Second Circuit gave any meaningful indica-
tion of how such an assessment is made. The Second Circuit ap-
parently assumed that the issue was a question of fact and thereby
foreclosed from further appellate consideration. 0 However, the Tax
Court had not made any express finding concerning the "thinness"
of the market; 31 rather, it seemed simply to have preferred the barter-
equation technique.32 Although the novel employment of this
device in the instant case may have reached the "true" value of the
stock, the obviousness of the fair market value is a shallow excuse for
disregarding what has heretofore been considered to be the deter-
minative factor in the valuation of traded securities, namely, the
trading price. The mischief is not the result achieved but rather
the method employed, for it creates uncertainty in an area of rela-
five certitude without realizing any offsetting benefits.
Even if it were appropriately found, using articulated standards,
that the market was too sparse for the purpose of discerning a fair
market value, it does not follow that the Tax Court should immedi-
ately resort to the barter-equation device. As the Second Circuit
realized, that technique of valuation embodies several infirmities:
first, the sides of the barter may be unequal; second, the determina-
tion of which side should be valued independently to be used as the
standard is arbitrary; and third, the evidence of value on one side
may be no more reliable than that on the other.33 In addition, the
barter-equation method has been employed only in a few situations
where the quid pro quo received was otherwise incapable of valua-
tion. However, there is no suggestion in the opinion that this stock
was incapable of valuation by the usual devices. Moreover, the value
29 Hughes, supra note 17, at 702-03.
0 "See 371 F.2d at 532.
21 See Seas Shipping Co., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1337, 1339 (1965).
32 See id. at 1343-44.
"3 371 F.2d at 529-30.
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of stock for which no market exists has been successfully computed
by the Treasury and the courts.34 The decision thus extends the
barter-equation method to a situation for which it was not designed,
without any discussion of the reason for such an extension other
than the conclusory observation that "necessity" required it. Of
course, one explanation of this novel result is the obviousness of the
thirty-dollar figure, which was readily discernible from the contract.
It was this factor of a clearly stated thirty-dollar contract price upon
which Judge Friendly relied in his concurring opinion to find an
estoppel against Seas Shipping.35 Thus the holding of the instant
case might well be limited to situations in which the parties had
contractually stipulated the value of the stock36 on the theory that the
stipulated figure represents the best evidence of value. However,
aside from the "best evidence" rationale, it is doubtful whether
the mere clarity of the result justifies abandonment of the accepted
systems of stock valuation unless there is some clearly articulated
competing reason. No such countervailing analysis was exhibited
in Seas Shipping. Considering both the rejection of the market
price and the utilization of the barter-equation technique, it may be
possible to denominate this case as the "obvious" exception rule
to the general standards of valuation; yet this exception will engender
a new problem-namely, the determination of when a result is
sufficiently obvious to warrant a departure from the accepted stan-
dards.
3'See Rev. Ruls. cited note 11 supra; Mathilde B. Hooper, 41 B.TA. 114, 129
(1940); Inga Bardahl, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 918 (1965). See generally 10 MERTENS, op.
cit. supra note 9, §§ 59.21 -.27.
"8 371 F.2d at 533.
1, Cf. Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954).
